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The rapid mobility of people, money, information, ideas, and commodities generally, 
has provided new opportunities for crime, and new challenges for law enforcement 
agencies. This paper reviews some of the major themes of crime and crime control in 
today’s small world. Major issues canvassed include drug traffic, illegal immigration, 
illicit traffic in small arms, and cyber crime.   
 
We observe that linkages between events and institutions overseas and at home are 
inevitable, and will inevitably proliferate. In particular, the diminishing capacity of 
states in our region and beyond to control crime will pose increasing challenges for 
Australian law enforcement.   
 
To deal effectively with transnational crime in the context of Australia’s immediate 
environment, activities need to extend beyond the traditional domain of policing to 
support stability and good governance, on the grounds that transnational crime tends 
to flourish in weak, or failed, regimes.  Peace keeping – an activity in which the AFP 
is actively involved – is one means through which such support can be provided.   
 
Following an initial overview of transnational crime, the paper describes the regional 
environment in the Asia-Pacific from the point of view of stability, governance and 
law and order.  It focuses in particular on the region to Australia’s immediate north 
and on the Pacific island countries.  It describes the type of transnational crime 
Australia is experiencing, either emanating from or passing through this region, and 
seeks to explain how these types of crime flourish within or are facilitated through 
countries with poor standards of governance or poorly resourced law enforcement 
regimes. 
 
The paper then proceeds to discuss a number of issues relating to peace keeping from 
the AFP’s perspective.  It covers the problems associated with peace keeping in an 
environment in which many different police cultures are involved and in which police 
are often relatively poorly resourced to do the job, especially in relation to the 
military, because of their primary role in law enforcement in their respective home 
jurisdictions.  It details what such problems mean for the AFP with its relatively small 
numbers of police officers and its Western Liberal outlook on the role of police in 
society. 
 
The paper concludes by discussing some of the broader implications for the AFP of 
working in an external environment such as the Asia-Pacific, including organisational, 
cultural and policy issues.   




Last April the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime was held in 
Vienna.  The main theme was transnational crime, and over 100 Justice Ministers got 
up, one after the other, to catalogue their countries’ threats and traumas, preventive 
structures and solutions.  As we listened to the stories from Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Austria, they were not very different from those of Panama, Pakistan, 
Portugal and Poland or those in Latvia, Laos, Lebanon and Luxembourg. 
 
They all catalogued issues such as the movement of people, the movement of drugs 
and other illegal commodities, the movement of small arms, the laundering of money, 
the sale and sexual exploitation of children, the epidemic of official corruption, the 
globalisation of business and the concomitant establishment of apparently legitimate 
“Front Companies” which provide a cloak for organised criminal activities, the 
changing nature of environmental and food crime, the violation of intellectual 
property rights, the burgeoning of financial fraud and on and on. 
 
On the one hand, it sounded like the woes of the world, something happening over 
there, but seemingly not touching those of us comfortable and secure here in 
Australia.  But no, that is not so.  Extreme poverty and political instability in 
Afghanistan has a significant effect on drug deals that take place in the park outside 
this hotel, and on burglary of nice houses in nearby suburbs.  The political troubles in 
Fiji last year created opportunities for villains and put pressure on Australian law 
enforcement (about which the AFP will speak later).  The construction union has 
made allegations about the infiltration of organised crime in the building industry and 
significant deleterious effects in which illegal immigrants play a part.   
 
All in all, the rapid mobility of people, money, information, ideas and commodities 
has an impact, not only on the global big picture, but on how we live in Adelaide, 
Armidale and Albany; on what our kids ingest at parties in Perth, Port Pirie and 
Parramatta, and certain pressures on shopkeepers, or the transmission of sexual 
diseases in Ballarat, Bowral and Brisbane. 
 
The Tenth UN Congress which produced the Vienna Declaration for international co-
operation, was the penultimate event before the signature of the Global Convention 
Against Transnational Organised Crime.  This Convention serves as a cooperative 
roadmap for a coordinated effective long-term attack on international crime.  
Remember that international crime is not something that begins and ends out there -  
it has an impact on how Australians live. 
 
There are two key issues in the first part of this paper: 
 
1. What types of threats are there for Australia; 
2. What can we do about them in the international arena; 
 
This second issue, what can we do in the international arena raises important 
questions about capacity and willingness.  There is a particularly delicate balance to 
be found here.  Some nations have great capacity to deal in the international arena, 
but because of political competition and priority for outcomes, have little willingness.  
Other countries have great willingness, but without the available capacity the 
willingness means very little.  They might as well try flying to the moon! 
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What types of threats 
 
Transnational crime as a concept connotes a variety of things.  Most tangible are 
those transnational “smuggling of commodities” crimes, be they drugs, arms, people, 
gems, wildlife, or other contraband.  These are the traditional mainstays of what we 
commonly think of as transnational criminal activity.  Yet recent times have seen 
increasing expansion of global technology and connectivity.  We now must also 
consider more ethereal transnational crimes, such as electronic transfers of illicit 
funds (money laundering), pirating or theft of intellectual property, and other forms of 
high tech crimes and fraud.  All of these crimes are about monetary gain.  Yet not all 
transnational crime is profit-motivated, nor are there “commodities or objects” 
involved in every case.  We must not overlook crimes which are politically motivated, 
such as international terrorism, and others such as digital child pornography and cyber 
crimes such as the transmission of computer viruses and denial of service attacks. 
 
Just as there are a broad array of activities which may be classed “transnational 
crime”, so to are there a variety of actors involved in perpetrating such crimes.  These 
include:  
• opportunistic local criminals who carry out local activities of transnational 
networks, such as distributing heroin from the Golden Triangle at street level in 
Adelaide, Perth or Melbourne;  
• operators who provide specialist services to facilitate transnational crime, such as 
document forgers in Malaysia who create false documents to aid the smuggling of 
illegal migrants, or vessel captains who sail the ships moving drug shipments 
coast to coast;   
• opportunistic entrepreneurs using new global technologies  -  one example 
involves a website in Canada which purported to offer free adult entertainment, 
available by downloading a special “viewer”.  The act of downloading the 
software, unbeknown to the user, disconnected the user’s modem from their local 
service provider and re-routed the connection through a provider in Moldova.  
The connection continued even after the user had left the site, and remained on 
until the computer was turned off.  Only later did their telephone bills indicate that 
they had incurred massive international phone charges.  (Corporate Crime 
Reporter, 24 February 1997, Internet Australia, April 1997). 
• corrupt officials who facilitate the movement of smuggled commodities into their 
country;   
• political or religious extremist groups seeking to wield international influence via 
terrorist action;   
• family-based syndicates involved in organising specific criminal activities 
between two countries, such as recruiting women from Thailand into sex work in 
Australia;  
• as well as the large transnational organised crime syndicates that have an 
international presence in many countries, are well established, well funded, 
engage in a variety of criminal activities, and may engage the services of all other 
players above. 
 
So how do such international actors and activities pose threats to Australia?  The first 
danger to Australia emerges when our country is perceived by international criminals 
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as an attractive destination for smuggled commodities.  This poses quite a range of 
threats:  
 
The threats can be analysed right across the spectrum, but here are some examples 
that relate to drugs. 
• first, through the influx of illicit and possibly dangerous goods to our 
communities (the prime examples here are drugs, but also arms and counterfeit 
currency).  Use of some drugs is inherently dangerous, yet the fact that the drugs 
are illicit poses additional threats to health and community safety: their illicit 
status means both preparation and using practices are unregulated and 
underground, increasing the risk of associated health problems stemming from 
unsafe injecting/use practices, or from cutting chemicals with unsafe mixing 
agents;   
• drug use also has implications for many other forms of crime (eg. burglary, 
robbery, violence) which are in many cases drug-related, therefore increases in the 
amount of illicit drugs entering the country may cause flow-on increases on other 
drug-motivated crimes as more people become drug users.  The DUMA project at 
the Australian Institute of Criminology has, for the first time demonstrated the 
links between illicit drug use and criminal activity across a range of jurisdictions.   
• The DUMA project has found that of those detained by police for property 
offences 86% tested positive to any drug, 43% tested positive to opiates, and 66% 
to cannabis.  In Bankstown, where the drug rates were highest 94% of those 
detained for property offences tested positive to any drug, while 78% of property 
offenders tested positive to opiates.  Interestingly, 80% of violent offenders had 
illicit substances in their urine.   These results give us a lot to worry about.  We do 
not stack up well in international comparisons.  We have comparable data for 
many cities in several countries, and the only city that has similar results to 
Bankstown and Parramatta is Liverpool in England.  Opiate use among detainees 
in Australian cities is considerably higher than it is for the 4 highest American 
cities  -  Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington and New York City.  Higher 
Australian rates also apply for amphetamines and cannabis, but the one 
consolation is that our cocaine rates are much lower than those in American cities.   
• To move commodities (eg. drugs, people, contraband) into Australia clandestinely 
requires some form of local criminal presence to receive them, and further 
distribute the drugs/ employ the illegal migrants/ and so on;  alternately, 
commodities exported illegally from Australia (eg. wildlife, abalone) require local 
coordination and exporting arrangements to be made by domestic criminals.  
Either of these scenarios contribute to a threat of increased criminal presence in 
Australia in order to facilitate transnational crime. 
• once a pathway into Australia is established for the smuggling of one commodity, 
international experience suggests that these routes and networks are ripe for 
subsequent exploitation for use in other smuggling markets.  Once a link is 
formed between Australia and South East Asia for the smuggling of illegal 
migrants, this pathway may then be used to smuggle in drugs.  These warnings 
have in fact been recognised by the Justice Minister in the context of links 
between syndicates smuggling migrants and drugs. 
• As domestic criminal markets for illegally imported goods become increasingly 
established and lucrative, this can lead to competition amongst criminals for 
control of the market.  This in turn leads to turf wars and inter-gang violence, such 
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as has been seen in Australia amongst rival outlaw motorcycle gangs for control 
of the amphetamine trade, or rival Asian groups for control over heroin 
distribution. 
• Australia has also been used as a staging ground for criminal activities abroad.  
Perhaps the most dramatic recent example involved the Aum Sect, which 
purchased a sheep station in a remote part of Western Australia and used it to test 
gases for use in their attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 (McFarlane and 
McLennan 1996). 
 
Aside from these “physical” threats from commodity crimes, Australia is also 
threatened economically.  On a large scale, time and resources must be spent dealing 
with the fallout from international crime : 
• eg. money spent on incarcerating/rehabilitating/treating offenders whose drug 
habit is fed by national drug importations 
• eg. money to house illegal immigrants 
• Finally, terrorist activity, whether it occurs within nations or cross-nationally, can 
impact adversely on distant nations.  Australians bear the cost of airport security 
largely attributable to the threat (and at times the reality) of terrorist violence on 
the other side of the globe.  And there is always the possibility that hatreds born 
overseas will manifest themselves in Australia, as has occurred, albeit on a limited 
scale, from time to time (Thompson 1996). 
 
On a more specific angle, there are economic costs when “dirty money” is : 
• made in Australia - this undermines our tax system as the money is untaxed and 
moved offshore 
• or is laundered through Australia – such as when illicit funds from offshore 
criminal groups are invested or laundered, eg. through property investments, 
gambling, or laundered through businesses in Australia. 
• Global competition may enhance the risk that Australian business may be 
offenders as well as victims of crime.  Pressures to engage in corrupt practices 
may be insurmountable.  Some of the most promising markets for Australian 
products exist in places where bribery, in subtle or less than subtle forms, has 
traditionally been an essential requisite to doing business.  
 
Finally, taking a broader focus, Australia is threatened by increasing threats to 
regional stability.  Transnational criminal groups are firmly established in the Asia-
Pacific region, which is used as both a source, transit and destination region for 
everything from drugs to arms to trafficked human beings.  Corruption is a real issue 
in some regional centres.  Many countries have few legal controls designed to tackle 
organised crime and its related processes (eg. money laundering).  This creates greater 
uncertainty to Australia as a regional partner and geographically-proximate country. 
 
In general, Australia’s economic and strategic interests are best served by world 
economic growth and political stability.  To the extent that an overseas nation’s 
economy is crippled by crime and corruption, it is that much less of an attractive 
market for Australian exports.  Abroad and at home, crime is bad for business.  
 
One need only look to events in Albania a few years back to see the trans-national 
ramifications of domestic criminality.  A massive fraud resulted in a significant 
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number of Albanians losing their life savings.  This in turn precipitated the collapse of 
the government, and a substantial exodus of Albanians seeking refuge in 
neighbouring Italy, with consequent strains on Italian law enforcement, emergency 
services, and immigration resources. 
 
Of no less significance is the potential for corruption to facilitate some forms of the 
transnational criminal activity.  The weakening of law enforcement or regulatory 
capabilities in one of Australia’s near neighbours can greatly enhance the capacity of 
criminals to use that jurisdiction as a “safe haven”, a staging area for a variety of 
criminal activities, or as a trans-shipment point for contraband.  What appears at first 
glance to be an internal matter in a nearby nation may ultimately impact on the streets 
of our Australian cities. 
 
The shrinking world also increases the risk that some forms of criminal activity, when 
effectively interdicted in one jurisdiction, may be displaced to another.  Small states 
are particularly vulnerable to criminal exploitation.  In some cases, displacement to 
safe criminal havens is facilitated by corruption, or other factors which produce a 
weakening in the legitimacy or effectiveness of a “host” government. 
 
But displacement is by no means dependent on the collapse or near collapse of the 
state.  In some jurisdictions, mere relaxation of regulatory vigilance will suffice.  The 
BCCI case, involving the collapse of a bank with 400 branches in 78 countries around 
the world, is illustrative.  Those jurisdictions such as Australia, with more stringent 
prudential regulations in place, were spared the difficulties of presiding over the 
collapse of yet another financial institution. 
 
 
What can be done to counter the effects of transnational 
crime? 
 
There is always a conflict between what might be seen as core policing business and 
practicing that in your local communities, and taking the very big picture, and moving 
well outside your comfort zones. 
 
Clearly, any response to transnational crime must have a transnational focus.  
However, there are national initiatives which can support the fight against 
transnational crime, make one’s own country potentially less susceptible or less 
attractive to international crime syndicates, and serve to protect the local community.  
Within Australia, responses have been legislative, administrative and “operational”.  
Legislatively, the response has been to recognise different types of transnational 
crime, create relevant offences (eg. new slavery and sexual servitude offences added 
to the Criminal Code in 1999), and/or increase penalties for these offences (eg. 
increased people smuggling penalties in 2000).  Administratively, arrangements both 
domestically and internationally have been made to facilitate cooperation between 
relevant agencies, such as through the creation of MOUs.  Operationally, the bodies 
charged with investigation of organised criminal activity generally within Australia 
are the AFP and the NCA.  More specific roles are held by other agencies: 
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• Customs has the lead role in controlling what goods cross our international 
border, and as such has a key role in preventing and detecting the entry of 
contraband 
• DIMA is responsible for preventing unlawful entry of persons into Australia and 
for implementing government immigration policy which aims to deter people 
smugglers from targeting Australia as a destination country (eg. through its 
mandatory detention policy, and recent changes to the protection visa system 
which prevent family sponsorship for refugees who have not sought offshore 
protection – i.e. who enter Australia illegally) 
• AUSTRAC monitors large-scale financial transactions and is the watchdog for 
detection of suspicious money transfers which may represent proceeds of crime 
• DFAT and the Attorney-General's Department (with AFP) have a role in takingto 
legal action against foreign criminals directing transnational activities which 
impact on Australia, eg. through the extradition process 
 
There is growing recognition that transnational criminal activity in Australia will 
frequently cut across the jurisdiction of a variety of agencies.  The response to this has 
included formation of a variety multi-agency task forces and strike teams, many of 
which target specific crime areas (eg. drugs, financial crime, people smuggling) 
which have enhanced cooperation and information-sharing at a national level.  In at 
least one area there has been a decision that a “whole-of-government” approach is 
needed to best tackle the issue (this is people smuggling). 
 
Perhaps most challenging in the years ahead will be the identification and prosecution 
of transnational offenders.  The time, money and uncertainty involved in international 
investigations, and if successful, extradition proceedings, requires law enforcement 
authorities to exercise careful judgment in deciding whether to pursue such offenders.  
Moreover, the cooperation across international boundaries in furtherance of such 
enforcement requires a significant level of understanding between jurisdictions.  
Authorities in the nation where the offence originated or the offender resides may 
have their own priorities, which do not always coincide with those of Australian law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
The basic approach to overcoming these problems lies in developing cooperation 
between nations.  This is more easily said than done, given the significant differences 
in legal systems, values and priorities around the world. 
 
Enlisting the assistance of overseas authorities is not an automatic process, and often 
requires pre-existing agreements relating to formal mutual assistance in criminal 
matters. Following recent amendments to the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
Act 1987, Australia may now grant assistance in criminal matters to any country. 
Bilateral mutual assistance treaties are in currently force with 18 nations.  A further 
four treaties have been signed, but are not yet in force.  Nevertheless, there are 
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Some governments may take unilateral action against their citizens or residents who 
commit criminal offenses on foreign soil.  Two of the most familiar examples in 
Australia are prosecutions for engaging in sexual activity with children, and for war 
crimes alleged to have been committed in World War Two.  But in many cases, this 
may still require the co-operation of a foreign government in obtaining evidence and 
possibly in extraditing the offender. 
 
Bilateral agreements 
The mobility of criminal offenders in a shrinking world has increased the need for 
arrangements to facilitate the apprehension and repatriation of those who seek to 
evade the law by fleeing to another jurisdiction.  The most common mechanism for 
this is extradition, which is done pursuant to a treaty or other formal arrangement 
between two nations.  Australia had signed bilateral extradition treaties with 32 
countries.  Twenty nine of these were in force.  A further 64 jurisdictions were 
covered by the London Extradition Scheme, which provides for the rendition of 
fugitive offenders among members of the Commonwealth of Nations.  Australia was 
the originator of 23 and the recipient of 56 extradition requests pending at 30 June 
2000 (Australia 2000, 193-4). 
 
Since 1985, Australia has adopted a  “no evidence” approach as the preferred basis 
for international extraditions.  The earlier approach required the production of a prima 
facie brief against the person sought, which effectively required foreign jurisdictions 
to produce evidence which accorded with Australia’s technical rules of admissibility.  
This was particularly difficult for civil law countries.  The new approach is  reflected 
in most of Australia’s modern extradition treaties and has generally facilitated 
cooperation between Australia and other jurisdictions. 
 
Some jurisdictions seek to prosecute offences committed abroad by foreign nationals 
against their own citizens.  The United States, for example, can seek extradition of 
alleged terrorists who have offended against citizens of the United States while 
abroad.  Extradition is by no means an automatic matter, as the recent experience of 
Australian fugitive Christopher Skase illustrates.  Moreover, other impediments exist.  
Some nations will not extradite their own citizens under any circumstances.  
Australia, as a matter of policy, will not extradite a fugitive who would face execution 
in the jurisdiction seeking his or her return.  Those jurisdictions which do practice 
capital punishment may waive the death penalty in order to obtain the extradition of a 
fugitive. 
 
In addition to extradition, a variety of arrangements may be put in place to facilitate 
cooperation between nations in the location and collection of evidence in furtherance 
of criminal investigation.  Mutual assistance treaties, as they are called, provide a 
legal basis for authorities in country “A” to obtain evidence for criminal 
investigations at the request of authorities from country “B”. 
 
Instruments of this kind cover a range of assistance including  
• the identification and location of persons 
• the service of documents 
• the obtaining of evidence, articles and documents 
• the execution of search and seizure requests; and 
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• assistance in relation to proceeds of crime. 
 
Australia was the originator of 102 mutual assistance requests, and the recipient of  
217 requests by other nations, which were pending at 30 June 2000 (Australia, 2000, 
196-7).  Notwithstanding this, Commissioner Palmer will point out tomorrow that the 
number of countries in the region who have Mutual Assistance treaties is very small. 
 
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 was amended in March 1997 to 
provide for “passive” application of the Act to all foreign countries, rather than 
requiring the Act to be specifically applied to particular countries by regulation.  This 
enables assistance to be provided and requested much more expeditiously than was 
previously the case. 
 
In addition, the posting of law enforcement personnel overseas can facilitate the 
development of informal networks which can help expedite response to the various 
requests which may arise from time to time.  Formal agreements are essential, but 
there is often no substitute for interpersonal contact.  The Australian Federal Police 
has 29 liaison officers stationed in 13 nations around the world.  In addition to serving 
Australia’s needs, the AFP and Australian consular staff are able to help overseas 
governmental authorities check on the probity of prospective investors from 
Australia.  AFP liaison officers may also assist their hosts in the training of law 
enforcement personnel and in the exchange of intelligence. 
 
Multilateral Facilitation 
International governmental organizations play a significant role in establishing the 
foundation for inter-nation cooperation in furtherance of criminal justice.  By helping 
set policy agendas and establishing standard frameworks, they help achieve 
significant economies, and are especially helpful to those small nations whose 
resources are severely limited.  The London-based Commonwealth Secretariat assists 
member nations in developing mutual assistance and extradition arrangements.  The 
United Nations Drug Control Program helps coordinate activities relating to the 
international control of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and transnational 
organised crime generally. 
 
International Treaties and Conventions  
These multilateral institutions deal with specific substantive or procedural issues.  
Illustrative examples include the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and the UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime signed in Palermo last December. 
 
The United Nations also provides standard frameworks such as the Model Treaty on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, adopted by the General Assembly on the 
recommendation of the Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders (http://www.ifs.univie.ac.at/uncjin/mosaic/unrule18.html).  A 
UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs was held in June 1998. 
 
In addition, organizations such as the Council of Europe have arranged multilateral 
conventions such as the European Convention on Extradition (1982); the  European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1987); the European 
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Convention on the Control of the Acquisition and Possession of Firearms by 
Individuals (1987); and the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (1990). 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) established in 1989 by  what was then 
known as the G-7 major industrial nations, developed a policy framework to combat 
money laundering around the world.  FATF now embraces 26 members, and includes 
an Asia Secretariat located at the headquarters of the National Crime Authority in 
Sydney, specifically to promote effective policies against money laundering in the 
Asian region. 
 
In December 1997 the Council for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) completed a multilateral Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.  The Convention 
requires Parties to prohibit acts of bribery of foreign public officials, and is designed 
to ensure that the international community cooperates in addressing this problem in an 
effective and coordinated manner.  The Australian Government has announced that it 
will take steps to become a party to this convention. 
 
And finally, the international police organization Interpol provides a network to 
facilitate the sharing of information and intelligence between participating police 
agencies around the world. 
 
International Non-governmental organizations  
Non governmental institutions may also contribute to activities with beneficial impact 
for criminal justice.  The Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP) was established in 1993 to provide a structured process for regional 
confidence building and security cooperation among countries 
and territories in the Asia Pacific region.  Among its goals is to better 
understand and articulate the security implications for the region posed by 
transnational crime.  Transparency International, the multinational anti-corruption 
group,  has been instrumental in promoting uniform legislation which would proscribe 
the offering of bribes in international business. 
 
It has become increasingly apparent that law enforcement agencies, singly or in 
combination, are not omnipotent.  Some forms of transnational crime, particularly 
those involving complex commercial fraud, would appear appropriate for a degree of 
response by the private sector.  Indeed, an entire industry has begun to emerge, in 
which multinational companies provide loss prevention and security services to 
private clients.  State agencies in many countries would be hard pressed in the current 





Australia has sought to take a proactive role in preventing transnational criminals 
from targeting our country, via action in transit countries aiming at disrupting 
movement of illicit goods en route.  This has included capacity-building of foreign 
law enforcement agencies, and the posting of Australian officials overseas.   
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Although it is not yet ratified, Australia has recently signed the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organised Crime.  If and when this instrument is ratified, 
Australia will then move to implement relevant provisions via changes to our 
domestic laws.  This will also fulfil a primary obligation under the Vienna 
Declaration.  Another step towards implementing this Declaration has been 
Australia’s active involvement in researching organised crime.  The AIC has 
conducted research into organised crime both at a domestic and international level.  
Our collaboration on two UN research initiatives, namely the Global Program against 
trafficking in human beings and the Transnational Organised Crime project, has 
served to outline Australia’s experience with organised crime to the international 
community, and has allowed Australia to provide research expertise to other 
developing countries in order to assist their assessment of and response to 
transnational crime. 
 
The world is becoming an increasingly interdependent place.  Those societies who 
ignore this do so at their peril.  By contrast, those who recognize this and who plan 
for and adapt to a smaller world are likely to benefit most and suffer least.  Australia’s 
cosmopolitan society lends itself well to  adjusting to life in the global village of the 
21st century.  Continuing analysis of crime and social issues at home and abroad, and 
continuing liaison between Australian criminal justice agencies and their overseas 
counterparts, will help further this adjustment. 
 
 
Local Solutions:  Fighting Transnational Crime in Australia’s 
Region 
 
Transnational crime has now taken root as a global problem intimately tied up with 
the security of nations.  This relationship between transnational crime and security 
was illustrated by a recently released major statement by the CIA.  This was the 
Global Trends 2015 document.  For the first time this document, which is updated 
every three years, incorporated what the CIA called “international criminal and 
terrorist networks” as major drivers of global change.   
 
But the link between transnational crime and security is not simply a manifestation of 
the threat transnational crime poses to the individual within Western, developed 
countries.  It also derives from the fact that transnational crime has been able to 
establish its global reach by embedding itself in weak, or failed, states. 
 
This relationship between transnational criminal activity and weak regimes was 
emphasised UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan in a speech delivered at the recent 
signing ceremony for the new UN Transnational Crime Convention.  I quote: 
 
Arrayed against these constructive forces [of civil society] … in ever greater numbers and with 
ever stronger weapons, are the forces of what I call “uncivil society”.  They are terrorists, 
criminals, drug dealers, traffickers in people, and others who undo the good works of civil 
society.  They take advantage of open borders, free markets and technological advances that 
bring so many benefits to the world’s people.  They thrive in countries with weak institutions … 
[emphasis added] 
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[I might add in passing, that the Transnational Crime Convention promises to change 
significantly not just the ground rules by which countries currently deal with each 
other on criminal matters, but also the normative values we bring to bear on the 
problem of working against transnational crime across jurisdictions.  Indeed, over 
time it may prove a significant milestone in creating the type of international 
jurisdiction that will be needed to deal with a problem that is truly global in its 
dimension.] 
 
Classic examples of the connection between regime weakness and transnational crime 
can be found in the three major drug producing countries:  Afghanistan, Burma and 
Colombia.  All are attempting to deal with significant insurgency movements and all 
are major growers, manufacturers and exporters of drugs.  In fact, an estimated 80% 
of heroin trafficked illegally into Australia is sourced from the troubled Golden 
Triangle region, most of it from Burma.  Another important example is the collapse of 
the former Soviet Union and the chronic problem of Russian Organised Crime that 
rose out of the turmoil that this event generated.   
 
However, in the spirit of the dictum that forms the title of this conference – global 
directions – local solutions – I want to give most of my attention to the region in 
Australia’s immediate surrounds – our neighbourhood.  In doing so, I will also be 
concerned to say something about what we, the AFP, can do to assist in lessening 
instability in this region, and thus helping to fight transnational crime.   
 
The Australian Federal Police has observed a trend whereby the Asian and South 
American based illicit drug syndicates trafficking into Australia stage their shipments 
through neighbouring countries, especially in the Pacific.  In part they do so to 
disguise the origin of the shipments, but in part also it is because the law enforcement 
capacity in some of the smaller neighbouring countries is weak – though no fault of 
their own, I might add.   
 
A recent striking use of this modus operandi occurred in Operation LOGRUNNER.  
LOGRUNNER is the code name for an operation involving the importation of a large 
quantity of heroin through Fiji.  The syndicate allegedly involved in the heroin 
operation was also allegedly dealing in false credit cards and peoples smuggling.  
Commissioner Palmer will refer to that operation and its implications in more detail 
tomorrow.  For now, it provides an excellent illustration of the growing propensity of 
criminal groups to use neighbourhood countries in the way I have just mentioned, 
keeping in mind that Fiji was at the time undergoing a coup attempt.   
 
In another example involving illicit drugs, an apparent attempt was made last August 
by a syndicate of Asians to use Papua New Guinea as a conduit for the transfer of a 
massive 1.2 tonnes of amphetamine precursors through Papua New Guinea to another, 
unknown, destination.  Because of the scale of this operation, the incident provides an 
unsettling reminder of the way in which our smaller neighbours can be targeted.  In 
this case, it appears the PNG authorities concerned may have been naïve or poorly 
informed about the shipment.  Either way, the incident illustrates just how vulnerable 
our smaller neighbours are to sophisticated criminal attack and how important it is for 
us to assist them to obtain the skills and resources to deal with it.   
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There are other instances in which our Pacific and Asian neighbours have been used 
by the Asian syndicates as trafficking venues to disguise the origin of drugs.  In many 
of these cases, the criminal groups are assisted by the poor resourcing of law 
enforcement and immigration agencies, which are consequently unable to identify the 
presence of criminals or their activities.   
 
We have also seen Pacific islands targeted for purposes of fraud and money 
laundering.  Given the small size and fragility of some of the island economies, such 
activities can actually undermine their stability.  
 
One such example occurred in 1996, when an Australian fraudster targeted Vanuatu 
with a $100 million advance fee fraud.  Had the fraud come off, it would have 
bankrupted the small island nation.  It was eventually resolved with the assistance of 
the AFP.  Similarly, there have been a number of damaging and highly destabilising 
pyramid schemes in the Pacific.  Two major ones have recently occurred in PNG.  
One only has to think of the effect of such schemes in places like Albania – where the 
government was brought down and widespread chaos ensued – to become fearful of 
the same thing occurring in Australia’s own Pacific back yard.   
 
Equally damaging is the issue of money laundering, which has become an accepted 
way of earning revenue in the case of some hard-pressed Pacific island economies.  
Having set themselves up as centres of financial convenience, these islands have 
found that they have also, as a matter of course, become host to a number of Russian 
and Asian organised crime figures and activities.   
 
In the case of Asian organised crime, the islands face a significant potential problem.  
This relates not so much to the long-standing and highly respected Asian trading 
communities throughout the islands, but rather to some of the recent arrivals.  In the 
case of PNG and the Solomon Islands, some of these people have entered on logging 
vessels with inadequate documentation and subsequently disappeared into the 
country.  Other island nations have conducted poorly considered schemes of 
economic migration designed to boost revenue, but with no adequate checks on the 
histories of the people buying their way in.   
 
People smuggling also provides a graphic illustration of the nexus between instability 
and transnational crime.   
 
Most of the people now attempting to enter Australia with the assistance of people 
smugglers are from two troubled countries in the Middle East/Southwest Asian region 
– Afghanistan and Iraq.  Both countries have suffered from decades of war and civil 
strife, giving rise to significant problems of refugees and displaced people.  Many, of 
course, enter Australia and other recipient countries by means of legitimate programs, 
but some move here with the assistance of people smugglers.   
 
In doing so, they are often staged through the region through countries in unsettled 
circumstances.  Indonesia is a case in point.  The smugglers also exploit the poverty 
of local traditional fishermen, who are suffering from depletion of fish stocks.   
 
The Australian response 
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Given this relationship between transnational crime and governance, Australia needs 
to work at several levels, only one of which direct law enforcement action.  Indeed, 
the complexity of the issues involved requires a whole-of-government approach. 
 
This approach has been followed successfully in the case of Australia’s efforts to deal 
with the problem of people smuggling.  We have established a highly successful 
people smuggling team comprising investigation and intelligence from the AFP, 
DIMA and Coastwatch.  A number of other government agencies are also involved in 
supporting the work of this team.  In support of the whole-of-government approach, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has played a key role in 
providing its services and liaison capability throughout the region.  The whole-of-
government approach is, I believe, an excellent model to use in attacking a range of 
crime types.   
 
Australia also supports a range of governance and aid programs designed to help 
stabilise troubled regional countries.  These include assistance to UNDCP crop 
substitution programs in Burma and elsewhere, regional AusAID projects against 
trafficking in women and children, efforts to provide aid support in the poorer, 
Eastern provinces of Indonesia, including to assist the fisher folk, law and order 
programs in places like Cambodia and PNG, support for various ombudsmans’ offices 
throughout the region and, on the part of the AFP, the Law Enforcement Cooperation 
Program (LECP), which assists counterpart law enforcement agencies with training 
and technical assistance.  A particular focus of the LECP has been the Pacific and 
South East Asia.   
 
I should add, however, that such attempts on the part of Australia to deal with issues 
of law enforcement and governance in the Asia-Pacific region are fraught with 
difficulty and complexity.   
 
Australia is a developed nation of Western Liberal outlook in the midst of an Asia-
Pacific region consisting of a number of countries with very different approaches to 
the rule of law, different levels of development, different policing and law 
enforcement capacities, and certainly a range of security and stability outlooks.  
Indeed, some people have even gone so far as to refer to an ‘arc of instability’ to 
Australia’s north and north east.   
 
Some of the complexity inherent in working in our region is certainly evident in one 
of the major activities the AFP undertakes in support of regional stability – peace 
keeping.    
 
Peace keeping 
Historically, police have been seen as the ‘poor cousins’ of the military when it comes 
to the peace keeping.  This status arose as a result of the grand peace keeping projects 
that followed the end of the Cold War, such as in Cambodia and the former 
Yugoslavia.  These enterprises were essentially regarded as ways of resolving military 
problems, so it was seen as most appropriate for military personnel to be involved.   
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Increasingly, however, we are realising the important role of peace keeping in 
situations of civil breakdown short of full-scale war– the preventive role, if you like.  
In such a role, police have as much to offer as the military, and in some cases more. 
 
Police frequently go into such situations unarmed and can often be used in a less 
politically threatening way than a military force.  They can play a direct role in the 
practical detail of peacekeeping, often working in small groups at the grass roots.  
They are trained not so much to deal with situations that have become violent 
(although that is an element of their training) but rather to prevent violence through 
negotiation and mediation.  And they are less costly than the military.   
 
Given the often opaque legal situations in which police peace keepers are required to 
operate, they are frequently likely to encounter problems of considerable political 
sensitivity.  Difficulties can also arise because they are usually part of a much larger 
contingent operating under the auspices of a much larger bureaucracy, with all of the 
attendant tensions and problems. 
 
For example, in East Timor there are 42 countries providing over 1400 civilian police 
to UNTAET.  The major players are Jordan (223), Portugal (165), The Philippines 
(104) and Australia (100).  Of these 100 Australians, 73 are provided by the AFP and 
the remainder by State police services.  Each of these countries will likely have a 
different approach to policing, depending on the way policing is conducted in their 
home service.  
 
Within this structure, Jordan and Portugal provide a ‘sharp edge’ rapid deployment 
capability fully equipped with riot gear.  Their police are perhaps also more 
philosophically inclined to use the full extent of force that this provides than 
Australian police would be.   
 
This means that they tend to be seen by some – including the Timorise leadership – as 
more able to deal effectively with emerging law and order issues and issues of group 
control, especially in Dili.   
 
I mention this because it provides an excellent illustration of the cultural and political 
complexity that is inherent in international policing, whether in the context of peace 
keeping or dealing with transnational crime.   
 
This complexity arises because of the diversity of international views about the role 
of police in society.  In Western democracies, police are empowered by virtue of the 
fact that they are ‘owned’ by the community to maintain law and order on the 
community’s behalf.  In some other countries, however, the police are perceived as a 
political arm of the Government, or are actually embedded within the military.  In a 
country like East Timor, it will clearly take some time before the community ‘owns’ 
its police force.   
 
This diversity of attitudes to policing throughout the Asia-Pacific raises the question: 
should Australia be asked to adapt its police culture, if you like, to meet the perceived 
needs of nations that have a history of somewhat more direct use of force by police, or 
should we stick to our own norms?  While the answer in my view is clearly the latter, 
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we need to be mindful both of the perception that our culture can create in the minds 
of others – for example that we are weak or uncommitted – and the effect working in 
other circumstances is likely to have on our own people.   
 
Similar problems are sure to be encountered in terms of our commitment to the 
Solomon Islands.  There we currently have 20 AFP officers deployed on a three 
month rotation with the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT).  Other 
members of the team include civilians and military from Australian and New Zealand.   
 
These people are disbursed throughout the country as part of small, mixed teams.  
There they encounter highly complex cultural and political circumstances without the 
benefit of a clearly defined role or special powers.  For them it is a totally new 
experience, outside anything they would likely encounter in policing in Australia.  
 
The short duration overseas peace keeping postings that we are involved with – 
usually from three to six months – provide an opportunity for considerable number of 
our people to encounter this work.  The experience teaches them to be highly versatile 
in their approach to other cultures and systems and strengthens their sense of self-
reliance.  This, in turn, provides excellent background for our growing interface with 
Asian and Pacific cultures in the context of our crime fighting role.  And this leads 
me, in the final part of my talk, to say a little more about what international policing 
is likely to mean for the AFP in future. 
 
 
What does international policing imply for the AFP? 
 
Because Australia is a country of predominantly European ethnicity and distinctly 
Western Liberal values located within the Asia-Pacific region, the nature of the 
dynamic established by our experience with international policing is likely to be 
especially interesting.   
 
Over the last few years, the AFP has put considerable effort into those areas of 
expertise that will help us work more effectively in the Region.  The nature of the 
change is evident from the fact we have recently added, or are shortly to add, seven 
liaison officers to our cadre of officers in the Asia-Pacific (not including North 
America), a rise of almost 30% in total numbers.  The number of training activities 
conducted in Asia and the Pacific, or involving Asians or Pacific islanders coming to 
Australia, has grown from virtually none to a very healthy rate today.  The number of 
major joint operations with Asian and Pacific law enforcement agencies has risen 
sharply, as has the number of regional visits by AFP people. 
 
At least to an extent, some of these changes are due to the fact that the AFP has 
benefited from fresh funding in recent years.  However, it is notable that we have 
chosen to spend a considerable portion of that funding in interacting far more closely 
with our Asian and Pacific neighbours.  We recognise that if we are to address the 
issue of transnational crime in this region, we will need to do so by engaging far more 
fully with it than we have in the past.   
 
AIC/AFP Fighting Transnational Crime  Adelaide, 6 March 2001
 16 
 
s:\ps-lib - ccrs\graycar speeches\4 graycar speeches 1995 - 2003 aust ins of criminology\01-03 adel int police\full paper 2.doc 
That such engagement has benefits is patently obvious.  Our escalating rate of 
seizures of illicit drugs is fully recorded in the press and Parliament, and I won’t re-
canvass the figures here.  What is less well known, however, is the role of our liaison 
work with fellow Asian law enforcement agencies in helping us to increase our 
seizures, and also the rate of seizures by counterpart law enforcement agencies in 
Asia. 
 
The same can also be said in relation to people smuggling.  Regional cooperation, 
both at the multilateral and bilateral levels, has been the hallmark of our efforts to 
prevent the illicit flow of people around the region, and especially into Australia.   
 
As well as benefits, closer engagement with the Region also carries some risks.  In 
working more closely in the Asia-Pacific, the AFP will increasingly encounter other 
cultural and legal attitudes to policing and the rule of law.  We will often be working 
in environments in which the cultural attitude to the giving of gifts and corruption is 
very different to our own.  We will also be working with systems in which the role of 
law enforcement is not just about protecting citizens from criminals, but also 
protecting governments from their citizens.   
 
To work in such an environment successfully we will need to provide our people with 
excellent training and education relating to Asian and Pacific cultures and languages.  
We will also need to broaden our recruitment base to include those with Asia and 
Pacific-related skills, whether derived from education, work or cultural background.  
And we will need to ensure that we have mature and dedicated people who can 
understand, and hence manage, the situations they are likely to encounter.   
 
A hierarchical, traditionally structured police service can neither recruit nor retain 
such people.  In that regard, I’m happy to say that the AFP has led the field – at least 
in Australian policing – in moving from a traditional disciplined service structure to a 
teams-based, professionally-oriented organisation.   
 
Such a structure is necessary not only in terms of recruitment, but also of dealing 
flexibly with the need to accommodate the constant comings and goings demanded of 





Transnational crime has a truly global reach – a point emphasised by Dr Graycar.  It 
also flourishes in weak or failed regimes – to paraphrase UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan.  To deal with transational crime we must also support governance and 
stabilisation measures.  To do that effectively, we must do it in our near region – a 
region through which transnational crime must stage to reach us.  For Australia, such 
support involves a very difficult learning process and particular sensitivity if our 
intervention is to be at all helpful.  
 
The role of an international police service like the AFP in supporting regional security 
derives from two mutually supporting activities – providing the means to counter 
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transnational crime and supporting good governance through peace keeping and peace 
monitoring activities.   
 
In providing that service to the region, Australia is doing no more than strengthening 
its own security, since regional stability is essential if we are to prevent a spill over of 
problems like illicit drug trafficking and illegal migration into Australia.   
 
The emergence of such an international role for a police service like the AFP, 
however, itself raises a number of new issues.  To learn to operate in such an 
environment, we need to acquire a set of skills very different to those usually required 
by the policeman or policewoman on the beat in suburban Australia.  We are also 
likely to encounter a whole new set of risks by operating in such an environment.   
